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Abstract 
Scholarship in International Relations has witnessed that the traditional concept of hierarchically 
organized global climate governance is joined by a network model of decentralized governance, which 
involves multiple actors. New actors performing networked climate governance include national 
governments, subnational organizations like cities, international organizations, corporations, 
epistemic communities, and civil society organizations. An insightful literature on networked climate 
governance has advanced our conceptual understanding of this empirical phenomenon. In parallel, 
rapidly growing research in psychology, sociology, and economics, and related disciplines sheds light 
on factors that contribute to individuals’ willingness to engage in collective climate action. This article 
reviews these seemingly disparate strands of literature and aims to build bridges between them. We 
focus on the factors underlying individuals’ decisions to participate in local-level climate initiatives – 
or grassroots organizations – including, for example, renewable energy cooperatives. Such initiatives 
are increasingly important parts of networked climate governance. Thus, networked governance can 
be conceived of as an opportunity structure for collective climate action, which may in turn influence 
citizens’ decisions to participate. Given the urgency to address climate change, this approach adds a 
critical novel perspective to on-going debates about effective governance arrangements. 
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Introduction 
After years of stalemate in international climate negotiations,1 governments reached a new and 
universal climate change agreement to govern the post-Kyoto era at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCCC) in Paris. The Paris 
Agreement not only aims to limit global warming to ‘well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels’; the 
Parties also agreed on ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C’.2 Reaching this goal 
will require constant action and strong commitments from state and a range of other actors in both 
the developed and developing world, since the new climate governance system is based on so-called 
national pledges.3 Moreover, there is consensus that incremental policy change will not suffice to 
respond to climate change, necessitating a society-wide transformation.4,5 This requires fundamental 
changes in production and consumption patterns,6 thereby indicating that responses to climate 
change require broad support from collective actors in the economy, from society and from individuals 
alike.7,8  
 
Today, global climate governance includes actors such as governments, international organizations 
and cities along with private actors such as corporations, epistemic communities, and civil society 
organizations.9,10 While the global climate governance architecture is fragmented and leads to 
different degrees of governance performance,11 this new structure has noticeably increased the 
opportunities of private actors to participate in international climate politics.12-14 However, triggering 
social change in response to climate change requires more far-reaching approaches, which calls for a 
greater involvement of citizens in climate governance.4-6,8,14 Drawing on different strands of literature, 
this review contends that citizens play an increasingly important role in transnational climate 
governance with a growing number of citizen climate initiatives, which are consequently driven by the 
motivation of individuals to engage in collective climate action.5,7,14 Having said that, we recognize 
that there is a specific literature – which is not reviewed here – elaborating on who expects individuals 
to get involved, what these actors’ motivations are to mobilizing individuals, and how they facilitate 
and govern the individuals’ involvement.15,16   
 
Individuals can support climate protection by changing their consumption behaviour, signing 
petitions, or other forms of political activism, to name but a few examples. Another – and arguably 
more effective17 – way to bring about system-wide transformations in response to climate change 
entails collective action. 14,18-25 Collective climate action such as neighbourhood-based climate 
protection initiatives is effective in three ways: First, membership in such citizen climate initiatives 
facilitates social learning and therefore brings about changes in the individuals’ attitudes and 
  
behaviour;5,6,19,20 second, climate initiatives can pave the way for policy innovations;28-30 third, 
especially institutionalized initiatives can influence climate politics as a collective actor.14,20,22,31 With 
regard to the third point, the new global architecture of climate governance promises more 
institutional venues and therefore more influence to citizen climate initiatives. We focus on 
institutionalized groups of individuals which are also addressed by the literatures on transnational 
advocacy or discourse networks,32,33 advocacy coalitions,34,35 and epistemic communities.36 In this 
context, it should be noted that not all aspects of individuals and their respective behaviour apply 
directly to collective actors, even though certain aspects of broader questions on collective action do 
transpire. 
 
Building on this premise, this review attempts to bring together two seemingly disparate research 
areas on collective climate action and networked climate governance with a view to advance both 
literatures and showcase the value of inter-disciplinary research. Learning about factors stimulating 
engagement in collective climate action provides valuable lessons for scholarship on networked 
climate governance on how to increase the effectiveness and inclusiveness of this governance mode. 
The study of collective climate action can benefit from acknowledging networked governance as an 
opportunity structure for collective climate action. In line with McAdam, we define opportunity 
structures as exogenous factors that limit or empower collective action.37 While McAdam 
concentrates on the political opportunity structures (i.e. openness of the institutionalized political 
system; stability of elite alignments; presence or elite allies; repression exercised by the state), our 
notion of opportunity structure is broader and encompasses any structures and incentives at the 
national or international level that encourage or discourage collective action. Our definition echoes 
the role Adger22 assigns to the state in facilitating specific behavioural patterns.   
 
The overall aim of this review is to demonstrate that both literatures constitute pieces of the same 
puzzle, which is about how we can adequately respond to the challenges of climate change. The key 
difference between the literatures concerns their levels of analysis, which at the same time also 
provides an opportunity for merging them. We first focus on the contributions the literatures make 
individually for solving this puzzle. The major strength of this review, however, stems from the second 
step, that is, its attempt to illustrate the complementarity of the two literatures.13,14,22 By conceiving 
networked climate governance as an opportunity structure through which collective climate action – 
defined as groups of individuals participating in the climate regime – can be facilitated, we strive to 
improve our understanding of how we can stimulate necessary processes of social change.  
 
  
MAPPING THE TWO RESEACH AREAS 
Addressing anthropogenic climate change represents a collective action problem par excellence. There 
is general consensus that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2) 
– from human activities are the major drivers of global warming.38 Limiting the global temperature 
increase to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels requires ‘a profound transformation of energy 
systems, through steep declines in carbon intensity across all sectors’.39 Doing so, however, requires 
collective action, that is, joint activities in the pursuit of a common interest. 14,20,22,31   
 
Assuming that individuals would weigh the benefits and costs of particular actions, Olson cautioned 
that the former would not act collectively due to participation costs.40 Individuals would rather abstain 
from collective action and benefit from the actions of others. This social dilemma is known as ‘free-
riding’. Based on this rationale, collective action for the provision of a common good critically depends 
on whether or not benefits can only be obtained from participation. Hardin then extended this 
reasoning by highlighting the importance of states (through providing binding rules) or markets 
(through providing property rights) for achieving collective action.41 
 
In the case of climate change, the common pool resource at the centre of collective action may be 
understood as the relatively stable atmospheric conditions that have allowed natural and human 
activities to evolve.42 However, since Hardin’s early assertion that markets or states are indispensable 
to produce common goods, other scholars have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that 
there are other ways to overcome the collective action problem. Notably, Ostrom argued that 
carefully designed institutional arrangements can in some cases outperform states and markets to 
address collective action problems.43 Studying mainly small to medium-sized common-pool resource 
systems, the Ostrom showed that in many cases, actors can self-organize to build enduring 
management systems, and that these arrangements are likely to be especially successful if they follow 
a number of institutional design principles: clearly defined boundaries; congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; collective-choice arrangements; monitoring; 
graduated sanctions; conflict resolution mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize; 
nested enterprises for common pool resources that are part of larger systems. 
 
Remarkably, collective action problems can and do occur both among individuals and states, meaning 
that free-riding affects the production of common goods in both realms. Therefore, even though at 
first glance the two levels of analysis seem disparate, the deeper and recurring question about 
collective action connects them. Another commonality is that despite free-riding, individuals and 
  
states engage in cooperation. 14,20,22,43 But the two do not necessarily march in tandem: even when 
international negotiations are gridlocked or ineffective, the decentralized nature of transnational 
climate governance provides an opportunity structure for non-state actors such as citizens’ climate 
initiatives to engage in cooperation.1,43  
 
Collective climate action 
The first theoretical and empirical phenomenon that this review addresses is collective climate action. 
14,20,22,31 Wright et al. conceive collective action to occur any time when a person acts as a 
‘representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire 
group’.44 Van Zomeren et al. argued that the decision of individuals to engage in collective action can 
be based on their perception that the problem in question of a collective nature.45,46 In other words, 
individuals believe that joint effort can best solve the problem. Since both problem and solution are 
perceived at the group level, pro-climate action depends on group or collective efficacy beliefs.  
 
The literature in environmental and social psychology differentiates between the intention to engage 
in collective climate action and the actual behaviour.47 While insightful research addresses both 
aspects, this review focuses on actual engagement in collective climate action since this is more 
compatible with the concept of networked climate governance and also more important with a view 
for the transformational changes needed to address climate change.4,5,17,23 Collective climate action 
can target both climate change mitigation (i.e., efforts to limit global warming) and adaptation (i.e., 
responses to anticipated and present manifestations of climate change), and both forms have been 
analysed in the literature.23,24,48 This review thereby focuses on mitigation-related collective climate 
action.  
 
Collective climate action can take many different forms, including organizing and participating in 
citizen initiatives, boycotts and buycotts, and demonstrations or even riots.45,49,50 Here we are strictly 
interested in institutionalized and peaceful forms of collective climate action, which often but not 
exclusively emerge from local levels. From this perspective, we are most interested in grassroots 
groups working towards climate change mitigation.6 It should be noted that grassroots organizations 
are different from NGOs with regard to the possibilities they offer for collective action.51 Therefore, 
whenever we henceforth refer to collective climate action, we restrict our focus to that of citizen 
involvement in grassroots organizations at the subnational (mostly local) level.  
 
  
For example, citizen renewable energy cooperatives have proliferated as the dominant form of 
community-based energy initiatives in the last few years.18,52 Individual renewable energy 
cooperatives differ starkly in terms of organization, financing, and membership,53 but all cooperatives 
have in common that the members jointly govern renewable energy production facilities at the local 
or regional scale. Another example of community-based collective climate action is the Transition 
Towns movement,24 having started with an initiative in the town of Totnes in the United Kingdom in 
2005. The Transition Towns movement focuses on the development of community-led responses to 
climate change and the finiteness of fossil fuels as well as the increasing social and economic 
sustainability. The essence of this initiative is to (re-)localize agriculture and food as well as energy 
production, use local building material and to invest in zero-energy housing, reduce waste, and 
consider new approaches to waste management. Communities that are interested in joining the 
movement must agree to a catalogue of 16 criteria, which refer to communication, constitutional 
aims, knowledge, skills, and working parameters. 54 
 
The Transition Towns movement is widely regarded as a success story due to its ‘formalised 
international organisational structure and its wide geographical distribution’.38 This case highlights 
that even if grassroots organizations engage in climate action at the local level, they can diffuse to the 
regional, national, or international level. Another example is the Citizens’ Climate Lobby, which is 
active internationally and consists of volunteers who engage with elected officials, the media, and the 
public in order to build support for climate protection measures.  
 
Networked Climate Governance 
Studies in International Relations and International Political Economy have traditionally focused on 
international climate negotiations and their outcomes in terms of producing a legally-binding global 
climate treaty.3,55-58 Given the negotiation outcomes, most studies concentrated on identifying the 
reasons for the failure of international cooperation. 59,60 However, in the past decade politicians and 
political scientists had to acknowledge the proliferation of new actors and forms of global climate 
governance.1,9,11,61-64 Ostrom stressed that a range of actors at different governance scales may have 
more capacity and willingness to address climate change in a bottom-up fashion than previously 
assumed.61 This approach, in turn, generates a heterogeneous, or polycentric, pattern of governance, 
which appears to be emerging alongside and increasingly through UNFCCC-driven approaches.62-64 The 
main feature of the new pattern of governance is that the traditional concept of hierarchically 
organized global climate governance is complemented with a network model of decentralized global 
climate governance.65  
  
 
The concept of networked governance refers to transnational climate partnerships that, according to 
Bäckstrand, can correspond to the following three types: governmental, private-to-private, and 
public-private (hybrid).66 Governmental climate partnerships involve public authorities such as 
government units, cities, or (units of) regional or international organizations. Cooperation in 
governmental climate partnerships is mostly achieved through soft forms of cooperation (e.g. by 
memorandum of understanding), such as in the case of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.9 
Private-to-private partnerships involve non-state actors such as firms and/or NGOs that collaborate 
with other firms and/or NGOs.67,68 Prominent examples include the certification scheme of the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification.69 Scholars have 
paid most attention to hybrid climate partnerships in which actors from the public and private sectors 
establish joint transnational networks with a set of governance objectives.70 A well-known example is 
the Clean Development Mechanism, where national governments hold the supreme authority, whilst 
private actors are responsible for the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based 
mechanism.71 In this review we closely follow Bäckstrand’s conception of networked climate 
governance, which means focusing on transnational types of networked governance.66  
 
The empirical reality which ‘denotes a shift from intergovernmental regimes to public–private and 
increasingly private-private cooperation and global policy-making’ furthermore justifies growing 
research on public-private partnerships.1 Drawing on the databases of transnational climate 
governance initiatives by cities, NGOs, firms, and other sub-state and non-state actors developed by 
Bulkeley et al.62 and Hoffmann,72 Hale and Roger68 arrive at 75 initiatives that primarily involve 
governance by sub-state and/or non-state actors. Not only is the considerable number of 
transnational climate partnerships interesting, but also – and even more – the fact that they are 
‘orchestrated’ by states or international organizations.68 This finding resonates with Pattberg’s 
analysis of some 232 public-private partnerships emerging from the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, which showed that states dominate in terms of leadership and 
general membership.70  
 
Do the different types of transnational climate partnerships contribute differently to global climate 
governance? Andonova et al.9 show that all three forms of transnational climate partnerships fulfil 
three governance functions: information-sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rule-
setting. Bäckstrand even identifies four functions of transnational climate partnerships: advocacy, rule 
and standard setting, rule implementation, and service provisions.66 Despite differences in their 
  
composition, all three types of transnational climate partnerships can, in principle, fulfil the same 
types of functions, although there is variation in the specific instruments of which they make use.  
 
Broadly speaking, transnational climate partnerships fulfil an important role in the global climate 
regime, as their purpose is to ‘implement multilateral rules and targets in the UNFCCC’.66 There are 
additional factors to explain the influence of transnational climate partnerships on the negotiation 
outcomes. One possibility is provided by the Conferences of the Parties (COP), a vital component of 
the UNFCC process, and the increasing number of side events they attract.78  
 
Connecting climate action and networked governance 
Given our definition of collective climate action as individuals engaging with grassroots organizations 
active at the local level, the link to networked governance should be straightforward. Regardless of 
whether the climate actions operate at the local, regional, national, or international level, networked 
governance provides an opportunity structure for the involvement of these initiatives in transnational 
climate governance.  Collins and Ison74 even go one step further to claim that the new global climate 
governance architecture means that the ‘participation of citizens, groups, organizations and 
businesses is now an essential element to tackle climate change’.  
 
In most cases, local initiatives form networks with other local initiatives and participate in networked 
governance as ‘transnational networks’ – a mode of operating that has also proven attractive for cities 
and municipalities that have formed their own networks (e.g. Energy Cities).68 Cities engage in 
transnational climate partnerships through their own networks, but also by participating in broader 
transnational networks such as the Climate Action Network.74 We can observe similar patterns for the 
participation of citizen climate initiatives in networked governance. The Transition Towns movement, 
for instance, very visibly participates in transnational climate partnerships.38,54 The European 
Federation for Groups and Cooperatives of Citizens for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(REScoop.eu) is another collective action network at the local level, having formed a network to 
participate in transnational climate partnerships. In short, grassroots organizations are increasingly 
taking part in networked climate governance.72,76,77 
 
Given the growing importance of non-state actor involvement in global climate politics, there has been 
increasing interest in their agency and authority as well as their legitimacy.78 With regard to grassroots 
movements, we focus on effectiveness and legitimacy considerations. We begin with the concept of 
legitimacy, which Bäckstrand66 – in the specific context of networked governance –conceives to result 
  
from accountability. More precisely, she distinguishes between participatory accountability (i.e., the 
representation of various stakeholders), transparency, and the availability of monitoring mechanisms. 
Here, we focus on the first aspect, namely to what extent a wide range of stakeholder groups can 
formally participate in the network (i.e. participatory accountability). Growing numbers of grassroots 
organizations are expected to increase the inclusiveness of transnational climate partnerships and 
therefore their legitimacy. With regard to the effectiveness of grassroots movements involved in 
transnational climate partnerships, the assessment criteria are ‘the products and activities 
partnerships produce and the behavioural changes that can be attributed to these activities’.70 
 
Thus far, few studies have systematically assessed the success and failure of grassroots innovations 
addressing climate change.38 However, some have argued that grassroots organizations potentially 
increase the effectiveness of networked governance. Hale,75 for instance, argues that such initiatives 
can successfully mobilize individuals to bring about the necessary social change to address climate 
change. Building on the literature on social innovation, Seyfang and Smith6 find that ‘grassroots 
innovations appear good at creating alternatives for sustainable development, but they do not connect 
forcefully with mainstream socio-technical regimes’. Put differently, grassroots organizations are 
perceived as drivers of social innovation and social learning.20 Given the limited discussion of how 
grassroots organizations may increase the effectiveness of networked climate governance, this is 
certainly a promising avenue for future research. 
 
All in all, drawing on existing research,12-14 we believe that there is a connection between collective 
climate action and networked climate governance, which we seek to explore in greater detail in this 
review. By systematically combining insights provided by the literatures on collective climate action 
and networked climate governance, we should be able to generate a significantly improved 
understanding of the drivers of and barriers to transformational social change that have proven 
necessary in responding to climate change.4,23 
 
DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION 
Given that the devastating consequences of climate change, the contribution of human activities, and 
the difficulties of governments in adopting adequate policy responses manifest ever more strongly, 
civil society has become an important source of climate policy innovations and collective climate 
action.67 But what motivates the individual to engage in such group-level collective action? This 
section addresses this research question by reviewing theories of behaviour change and pathway 
  
models to collective climate action. These scholarly debates offer insights into why individuals may or 
may not participate in actions at the group level.  
 
Theories of behaviour change 
How can we motivate individuals to take pro-environmental actions? This question has been 
addressed by a vast corpus of literature.5 One of the most prominent explanations has been that 
individuals do not participate in pro-environmental actions due to their lack of information.79 The 
corresponding literature argues that filling this information deficit should stimulate individual 
behaviour change. However, the simple view that providing people with information on climate 
change science will lead to direct and significant behaviour change in a linear way has been challenged 
quite early in the literature, as other factors such as pre-existing knowledge and structural constraints 
influence how individuals process and act on such information.80 This is, of course, not to say that 
public climate change education is unnecessary and it certainly remains an important part of climate 
change governance, but precisely how and to whom one communicates influences how individuals 
receive and process information.81  
 
A key issue with climate change is that it is often perceived as hardly relevant to the individual’s daily 
lives.82 A suggested remedy thus involves tailoring climate change messages in order to highlight its 
proximal consequences. Yet Brügger et al.83 explain that the effect of more localized climate change 
information depends very much on how that information interacts with the receiving individuals’ 
general characteristics and how they process that information. For example, proximal information 
may act as a deterrent to individuals who value wider communities and the environment. 
Furthermore, Schoenefeld and McCauley84 show that empirical evidence does not support a 
straightforward, self-interest based theorization of this issue. In fact, people with more self-interested 
value orientations who received local climate information were found to disengage from climate 
change action and policy support, producing a ‘reactance effect’. Thus, simply highlighting the local 
effects of climate change is unlikely to unequivocally stimulate action. Making such approaches 
effective requires a deep contextual understanding of the target audience.83 
 
In a similar vein, moving climate change closer to people by highlighting potential co-benefits of 
climate change policy61,85 has generated mixed empirical evidence. Some researchers indeed found 
that individuals – particularly those who were already concerned about climate change – responded 
positively to re-framing climate change by, for example, focusing on public health benefits.81 But 
  
others found the opposite, even when taking into account pre-existing individual characteristics such 
as beliefs in the gravity of climate change, climate change awareness or political ideology.86  
 
An informational intervention that has received considerable high-level attention by policy-makers is 
the ‘nudge’ approach popularized by Thaler and Sunstein.87 Their argument goes that because humans 
have limited cognitive capacity to process information and often rely on heuristics in their decision-
making, small interventions, such as choosing default options when presenting a range of choices (e.g., 
making double-sided printing a default option) can have significant positive influences in a range of 
fields, possibly including climate change.88,89  
 
The second strand of literature examines the role of individual psychological drivers of behaviour 
change including values, attitudes, beliefs, and concerns. Values, or ‘enduring belief[s] that a specific 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence’,90 correlate strongly and consistently with pro-
environmental and pro-climate behaviour. As Corner et al.91 emphasize in their detailed review, 
individuals with ‘self-transcendent’ value orientations (such as caring about wider communities, or 
the environment) engage more in pro-environmental behaviour than people who privilege ‘self-
enhancing’ values that focus on individual gain or status.84 Attitudes may be defined as ‘a learned 
predisposition to respond in a consistently favourable or unfavourable manner with respect to a given 
object’.92 Large-scale meta-analyses have shown that, in contrast to values, attitudes are less enduring 
and less linked with pro-environmental behaviour.93 Given that attitudes are less engrained, other 
factors, such as knowledge or structural constraints to address climate change are likely to play 
important roles.94,96 Likewise, beliefs have been found to be weaker predictors of taking action than 
values.92 However, it is worth noting that wider beliefs about science in general influence how people 
interact with climate change. Recent research has shown that giving people messages about rapid 
progress in science tends to reduce their willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviour.96 By 
the same token, beliefs and appeals about environmental justice (e.g., the distributions of 
environmental effects on different groups in society) have been shown to influence pro-
environmental intentions.26 Finally, drawing on a survey of Swedish households, Nässén et al.97 show 
that concerns over environmental protection and climate change, inter alia, lower the individuals’ 
consumption-accounted GHG emissions.  
 
The third literature builds upon social norms as drivers of pro-environmental behaviour.5,20 A social 
norm may be defined as what individuals deem normal behaviour in any given situation.98 When used 
  
in informational interventions, norm-based messaging has been shown to strongly influence a range 
of individual decisions and behaviour related to climate change, including energy conservation or the 
use of environmental resources.99 This also holds true for a range of climate-change related behaviour, 
and norms are often stronger than a range of other drivers.23  
 
Studies have shown that the most effective norm-based messages are those that correspond most 
closely with the characteristics of a group to which an individual belongs.100 The relationship between 
norms and pro-environmental behaviour is further mediated by how connected individuals feel to a 
particular group from which they draw their norms.101 However, using such descriptive social norms – 
i.e., describing what other people do – can backfire, as people who perform better than the norm may 
adjust their behaviour towards what they perceive as normal – the so-called ‘boomerang effect’.102 
However, adding an ‘injunctive norm’, or a message that indicates what is normally considered 
desirable or ‘good’ behaviour, has been shown to reduce this effect. In sum, social norms have proven 
consequential in information-based interventions, but they must be handled carefully to avoid 
potentially backfiring. 
 
There are also a range of additional variables that have been shown to influence pro-environmental 
behaviour and thus an individual’s willingness to participate in group-level climate action. Newer 
studies highlighted that it is not only the variable of climate-related information– that is, factual 
knowledge – as such matters, but rather how the information is communicated and which emotions 
it induces.103 As Leviston et al.82 show in a recent study, people tend to associate a range of images 
with climate change, and some of these images have differing affective responses: Linking climate 
change with disaster appeared to generate higher emotional arousal than linking it with deserted 
landscapes. While tapping into human emotions can be crucial to help individuals understand the full 
moral dimensions of climate change risks,104 so far researchers have generally cautioned against fear-
based appeals to stimulate action on climate change, as these have been shown to be potentially 
counterproductive as they can make people feel helpless and overwhelmed.7,47,105 However, Pidgeon 
and Fischhoff106 argue that ‘appropriately framed emotional appeals can motivate climate action, 
given the right supporting conditions’. With regard to the latter, the authors, among others, stress the 
importance of identifying viable ways to act on climate change as well as invoking feelings of personal 
control and support of others.104 
 
Pathway Models 
  
Recently a strand of literature has developed that uses concepts in environmental and social 
psychology to investigate reactions to climate change that are closely associated with the work of 
Bamberg and collaborators.23-25,93 Accordingly, Bamberg et al.24 indicate four pathways leading to 
collective climate action. The first pathway builds on the reasoning of Olson40 and contends that 
individuals are more likely to participate in collective action if there is no other way for obtaining the 
associated benefits, that is, through selective incentives. The second pathway we already briefly 
sketched above: the collective efficacy pathway. The reasoning underlying this pathway is that rational 
individuals will participate in collective action if they perceive that the group as a whole is able to 
successfully organize and conduct collective actions. Closely related to this is the third pathway: group-
based emotions pathway. It reasons that ‘individuals first appraise whether their disadvantage is 
group-level, then appraise whether the group disadvantage is fair, legitimate, and just. Appraising the 
collective disadvantage negatively evokes group-based anger, and motivates individuals to take 
collective action’.24 The fourth pathway refers to social identity theory, which is widely regarded as 
one of the most influential theories in social psychology. It rests on the assumption that individuals 
partly define themselves through group memberships, and come to think, feel, and act as group 
members.23 Given this basic reasoning, social identity theory has been linked with a wide range of 
behavioural outcomes that can be understood as occurring out of the joint interest of the group. From 
this, it follows that a strong sense of collective identity is needed for group members to engage in 
collective action.24 
 
A further development of this perspective is the integrative social identity model of collective action 
(SIMCA) proposed by van Zomeren et al.46 These scholars propose three underlying drivers of 
collective action, namely the perceived existence of a social injustice; efficacy (related to behavioural 
control – see above); and identity. In other words, it is a model that integrates the efficacy, the 
emotions and the identity pathways. Importantly, this theory goes beyond assessing individual 
behaviours and their correlates precisely because it takes into account the effects of group identity 
and issues such as politicization. This matters because collective action is, per definition, a group 
activity typically undertaken to achieve a common aim. More recent research has not only validated 
this model, but also begun to add potential additional factors, such as social norms and sense of group 
identity and collective responsibility.23,107 Taken together, there is thus a strong indication that in 
addition to the factors discussed above, identity and affect play important roles in stimulating 
collective action to address climate change. 
 
INTEGRATING COLLECTIVE CLIMATE ACTION AND NETWORKED GOVERNANCE 
  
Studies in behavioural sciences often concentrate on the determinants of human behaviour. Our 
review summarized numerous factors that determine an individual’s willingness to participate in local-
level climate action. Rather than stressing differences or incompatibilities between the approaches 
and variables reviewed, we follow Capstick et al.108 and emphasize numerous overlaps and 
complementarities. Adding to this important perspective, we argue that it is crucial to pay close 
attention to contextual factors influencing individual behaviour. This approach resonates with the 
broader argument that there are no general panaceas that will work irrespective of local governance 
contexts.109 This means that general lessons about the effects of information, values, norms, 
emotions, or identity emerging from relevant literatures need to be considered in specific governance 
contexts.110  
 
Recent studies on collective climate action have taken the embeddedness of individuals in social 
contexts into account.23-25,45,46, 111- 113 We contend that developing a much deeper understanding of 
what drives individuals to participate in collective action needs to go one step further and pay 
attention to the ‘extent to which state and other actors configure the fabric and the texture of daily 
life’.111 At the most basic level, the characteristics of political systems matter: Because democracies 
offer more opportunities for participation and initiative than autocracies, the former are likely better 
at stimulating collective climate action than the latter.15, 16, 47, 114,115 Building on this line of thought, we 
argue that the changes in the global climate governance architecture and especially growing 
opportunities for non-state actor participation constitute an important contextual factor that is worth 
taking into consideration.14,22  
 
More specifically, we argue that the notion of opportunity structure37 is a fruitful concept to link the 
literatures on collective climate action with studies of networked climate governance. The use of the 
concept of opportunity structures allows for constructing an overarching analytical perspective that 
echoes prominent political science theories. For example, the influential advocacy coalition 
framework holds that the attainment of political goals is determined by the actor coalitions’ beliefs 
and resources, as well as the strategies they apply given the institutional venue in which they 
operate.33,34 By our understanding, group-level climate actions operate within the context of 
networked climate governance. We expect that transnational climate networks determine which 
strategies the groups choose to pursue their interests at the national and the international level. At 
the same time, we posit that knowledge regarding the existence of networked governance and the 
possibility to influence international climate politics affects the decision of individuals to join group-
level initiatives. In what follows we concentrate on this second aspect.  
  
 
How do individuals become aware of the context in which they make decisions? They can either 
observe this context directly or indirectly. At the local level, for instance, people – especially those 
with extensive personal networks – can observe their socio-political and socio-technological context 
more easily. They can directly observe the need and the opportunity structure for engagement in 
climate action – such as, for example, starting an energy cooperative to supply their community 
energy.18 At higher levels, however, individuals cannot directly evaluate their action context and thus 
rely on information from other sources. But this creates an important dilemma, because the empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of climate change information and knowledge to stimulate collective 
action is mixed at best. A starting point to resolve this issue is that information effectiveness very 
much depends on the characteristics of receivers and at times on those of the communicators.81 Thus, 
singular and decontextualized information provision is unlikely to induce significant shifts in 
knowledge, beliefs and subsequent climate change-related behaviour.110 
 
Communicating in context is thus an important way forward. For example, O’Neill and Nicholson-
Cole105 argue that communication approaches that account for individuals’ ‘personal points of 
reference’ (e.g. by appreciating their attitudes, beliefs, and values) and address the local and regional 
context are more likely to enhance the individuals’ engagement with climate change. But the mass 
media tend to represent climate change as a global action problem.114 Following the previous 
reasoning and considering the importance of the mass media in communicating climate change,116,117 
one would expect that the emphasis placed on the global dimension of climate change could entail 
disengagement from collective climate action. As Wolf and Moser47 reason, the ‘immensity of this 
‘global’ problem versus individual actions’ is likely to make people feel helpless and discourage them 
from participating in group-level action. 
 
Carefully crafted strategic communication approaches can potentially address some of these 
difficulties.117 Individuals need to understand that transnational climate partnerships exist and how 
they function, but at the same time communicators need to remain cognizant of local contexts as well 
as the full range of psycho-social and contextual factors we discussed above. To recall, collective 
climate action through grassroots organizations is an integrative component of networked climate 
governance.62,66,70 Therefore, audiences need more systematic information about the global climate 
governance architecture and how the latter is linked with local-level action. However, when doing so, 
it matters immensely to take into account prevailing social norms, value orientations, pre-existing 
knowledge and other psycho-social variables, as well as the nature of wider social practices and the 
  
physical environment.5,13 For example, if there is already a social norm, or indeed a wider social 
practice to collaborate in other areas, and if people believe that climate change is a problem and value 
their natural environment as well as the well-being of other communities, and if the physical 
conditions are such that actions can reasonably be taken (e.g., there are feasible sources of renewable 
energies), then it makes sense to anchor any communication in these key community characteristics.  
 
When thinking of communication, one may think of the mass media, but communication is also 
transmitted in other forms. For example, politicians may invite citizens to participate in climate actions 
and explain that their efforts are not confined to the local level, but will transpire to higher levels. 
Likewise, NGOs could communicate the nature of networked climate governance and how the 
existence of this structure helps to make a difference at the global level. Done in this way, improving 
knowledge about networked climate governance and potentially offering a range of other 
opportunities to engage could empower individuals to feel that their actions are meaningful and not 
confined to the local level, but that they can contribute – by participating in transnational climate 
networks – to solving the problem at the global level.6 Doing so may especially engage young people 
by showing them what they can do and how their actions have an impact beyond their 
neighbourhood.81 
 
Again, the Transitions Town movement is a suitable example. While being a local initiative, the 
members are committed to networking with a view to expanding the movement’s geographical 
scope.38,54 The fact that the individual movements are local provides an important venue for individual 
involvement, while strategic communication about the geographical spread and membership in new 
transnational climate partnerships additionally signals that impact reaches well beyond the local level.  
 
The discussion above shows that there is an important connection between networked governance 
and research on the determinants of individual participation in collective climate action. To 
understand this connection, we need to conceive of networked climate governance as an opportunity 
structure, which may upscale local-level climate action to higher levels and encourage citizens’ 
involvement. Given the complexity of global climate governance, however, it is important to explain 
opportunity structures in understandable ways, which bears some challenges. On the one hand, 
organizations participating in networked governance will need to invest in communication, but 
resource constraints may make doing so difficult. On the other hand, the approach requires some 
basic recognition of the new global climate governance architecture and the crucial role of individual 
actors through collective action. Mobilizing individuals through transnational climate partnerships 
  
calls for some agreement on and support for this new governance form by all actors involved, including 
states.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
The reasoning above prompts three research questions to guide future research: the first one refers 
to the empirical testing regarding the postulated relationship between the contextual communication 
of the opportunity structures provided by networked governance and greater incentives for 
engagement in collective action. One would initially need to assess how much respondents know 
about existing governance networks and what other socio-psychological factors are relevant in driving 
collective action in a particular case (and whether there are any factors that extant literatures have 
not yet identified). Doing so will paint a much more detailed and sophisticated picture of the relative 
efficacy of a range of factors in stimulating collective action. It would also assist social learning as local 
initiatives go transnational; for, other groups would be able to gauge whether the key factors that led 
to success or failure elsewhere can be reasonably expected to be relevant to them. Subsequent 
analyses could then implement framing analyses103 to investigate whether or not the opportunity 
structures provided by networked governance influences individuals’ willingness to engage in 
collective climate action. Doing so would particularly allow for testing which of the pathways discussed 
above drive collective climate actions most effectively, and what contextual factors matter most. To 
recall, Bamberg et al.24 identify four mechanisms through which individuals can be motivated to 
participate in group-level action, including selective incentives, rationality considerations, emotions, 
and social identity. Which of these pathways would be most effective? And how can they highlight 
that local-level climate action can transpire to the global level? These are questions worth 
investigating in future research.   
 
The second area relates to the role of grassroots organizations in transnational climate partnerships. 
What is their influence vis-à-vis the other members of such networks that are arguably more 
powerful? Importantly, Uphoff51 systematically compared the participation of grassroots 
organizations and NGOs to show that they differ in their collective action possibilities, which we expect 
to be reflected in how they can participate in global climate governance. While there is a small but 
growing literature on the global diffusion of grassroots organizations,38 studies of networked climate 
governance have paid less attention to how exactly these organizations participate in networked 
climate governance via-à-vis the other members. Empirical data provided by Bulkeley et al., 62 Hale 
and Roger, 68 Pattberg,70 and Hoffmann,72 could serve as a starting point for addressing this research 
question. Moreover, such a perspective would fit nicely with studies of transnational advocacy 
  
networks32 and epistemic communities.36 Another possibility for attaining an analytical value-added is 
to examine the effectiveness of transnational climate networks of varying compositions with a view 
to learn which of them is more influential in climate politics. This perspective would directly draw on 
the concept of advocacy coalitions, as put forward by Sabatier.33 
 
The third avenue for future research is about how participation in transnational climate partnerships 
may affect the internal structures and management of grassroots organizations. A first crucial step 
involves building networks at the regional, national or international level, a potentially resource-
intensive activity.14 However, spreading ideas via networks may reduce the innovative capacity of 
grassroots organizations as they shift attention from content to organizational forms that can be easily 
adopted elsewhere. The rather specific issue focus of grassroots organizations51 generates important 
questions about what happens to these organizations once other actors in the governance network 
adopt their key messages or approaches.27 Again, the advocacy coalition framework33 may provide a 
useful analytical perspective for addressing this question since the essence of that framework is that 
actor coalitions compete against each other over political influence. From this perspective, grassroots 
organizations may lose their competitive advantage in such constellations if large parts of their 
demands are taken up by more powerful advocacy coalitions. Alternatively, more specific theories on 
climate policy innovations30 could be applied to address this research question.   
 
Conclusion 
This review had two key starting points: first, the empirical manifestation of a growing number of 
transnational climate partnerships;1,66,70 second, the realization that adequate responses to climate 
change require innovative policy responses30 and collective action14 on a variety of scales to bring 
about fundamental social change.4 While disparate at first glance, the new global climate governance 
architecture and collective climate action are connected to one another in important ways. As we 
argue above, networked climate governance serves as an opportunity structure for collective climate 
action in the sense that it may potentially encourage individuals to join group-level climate actions. 
The rationale underlying this expectation is that individuals who are, in principal, willing to participate 
in such initiatives (e.g. renewable energy cooperatives) may be even more convinced to do so when 
they realize that their actions transpire beyond the local level and when doing so matches their 
broader value, norm, and identity-based orientations. At the same time, networked governance 
requires social innovation6,27,28,38,77 and learning19,120 to produce effective climate change responses. 
Currently, comparatively few grassroots organizations – the form of local-level collective at the centre 
of this review – participate in networked climate governance.70 This might be due to two factors: First, 
  
it is a deliberate decision of grassroots organizations to concentrate their activities on the local level; 
second, generally only few grassroots organizations exist that could participate in transnational 
climate governance. With regard to the second explanation, we would argue that grassroots 
organizations could become better represented in networked climate governance if a greater number 
of individuals joined them. Different varieties of psychological literatures suggest that the individuals 
decisions to join such collective attempts are determined by their perceptions of the efficacy of 
collective action along with group-based emotions, social identity, as well as social norms and 
values.23-25 
 
Drawing on the psychological literature and combining it with studies in communication science, one 
way to potentially stimulate more collective action is to use communication.112 Providing individuals 
with information about the possibility that their local initiatives may contribute to transnational 
climate governance could spark their interest in getting involved. The information can be supplied by 
policy-makers or private actors such as NGOs either directly or indirectly by relying on the media. Yet 
one must bear in mind that the communication strategies used must be crafted carefully with a view 
to provide encouragement rather than discouragement.47 Moreover, we want to stress that this 
finding is derived from studies in the fields of communication science and psychology. Sociological 
research contends that beliefs, values, and attitudes are co-constituted by behaviour and social 
practices. Following this view, the media could not be assigned such a prominent role in encouraging 
individuals to participate in grassroots movements.5,8,110,111,117,118 Rather, sociological research makes 
a plea for the ‘generation and circulation of elements of which variously sustainable practices are 
made’.111 
 
Greater participation in citizen climate initiatives may then stimulate the inclusiveness of networked 
governance – by expanding grassroots organization participation – and contribute to responding to 
climate change with the necessary ambition in terms of bringing about fundamental social change. 
Moreover, citizen climate initiatives could help to devise and spread more innovative climate policy 
measures, as multiple local-level initiatives are expected to contribute their respective views on the 
causes of climate change and the solutions they have experimented with.72 Using this analytical 
perspective would enrich the study of networked climate governance with key questions on climate 
policy innovation.30 
 
More broadly, we argue that there is considerable interdependence between networked climate 
governance and collective climate action and we made an attempt to overcome existing disciplinary 
  
boundaries to advance this perspective. While the networked climate governance idea originated in 
International Relations and governance studies, collective climate action is associated with 
psychology, sociology, economics, and related disciplines.  Despite the different levels of analysis (i.e., 
states or transnational climate partnerships versus individuals), recurring questions on the logic of 
collection action problems connects these literatures. Remarkably, the connection between 
networked climate governance and collective climate action we highlight partially resemble 
prominent theories of policy change in political science. Previously we discussed that networked 
climate governance can be conceived as an analytical concept known as institutional venue in the 
advocacy coalition framework,33,34 which determines how different actor groups interact with and 
compete against each other over political influence. The individuals can be accommodated in this 
framework in such a way that they decide whether and which advocacy coalition to join depending on 
how they perceive the institutional venues. Exploring and potentially strengthening this link will 
greatly enrich our current understanding of climate governance and ultimately contribute to its 
effectiveness.  
 
As stated above, the core objective of this review was to build bridges between different types of 
literatures and levels of analysis. Given this goal we did not pay attention to contributions within the 
respective literatures, which represent more controversial views or stress uncertainties inherent to 
the theoretical lenses applied. We focused on individuals and the structures that surround them, but 
acknowledge this is a somewhat limited analytical perspective. Arguably, conceptualising individuals 
as atomistic, rational actors, or by contrast as entirely constrained by institutions or discourses are 
extreme ends of an extensive continuum. We believe that depending on the issue and contextual 
circumstances, most cases will fall somewhere on this continuum (rather than the ends). In a world 
where everything is controlled by rigid and unmovable discourses, it seems futile to even begin to 
think of change emanating from individuals (but there are many examples where this does appear to 
happen, as we show in the article). By the same token, assuming that individuals are staunch, 
unconstrained rationalists who can make whatever choice they like under any circumstances is equally 
unreasonable. In fact, we show in numerous ways how a range of external factors influence 
individuals, at times in irrational ways. With any particular issue, it is task of sound social research to 
identify the opportunities and constraints emanating from the complex nexus of individuals, social 
structures, and other elements, such as characteristics of the material world. All are likely to play some 
role in transformational responses to climate change.4  
 
  
We believe that the literatures we review in this article provide useful pointers for researchers to 
explore climate change-related issues with a view to individual, social structures, and the material 
world. Yet we would like to flag that there exist other theoretical perspectives and assessment of the 
empirical phenomena presented here and we invite future research to consider engaging with that 
literature in a view to complete the picture we presented.  
 
Alongside our call to consider a multitude of theoretical perspectives when investigating the 
relationship between collective climate action and networked climate governance, there are several 
empirical research questions that warrant future attention. While we have already highlighted some 
of these in the previous section, we believe that investigating whether networked climate governance 
is helping grassroots organizations to become a more central players in climate politics, or whether 
these groups remain at the fringes, is of particular importance.6, 27, 49, 121-123  In other words and 
following the insights offered by Pattberg:70 does a growing number of grassroots movements 
involved in transnational climate partnerships lead to new activities that then lead to behavioural 
changes? This is just one of many worthy research questions bringing together global climate 
governance and social change attained by individuals.  
 
Governance 
Governance can be understood as ‘shaping society in desired directions’.110 While the state plays a key 
role in governing,30 most studies in governance are interested in why non-state actors take matters 
into their own hands and act as substitutes for or in collaboration with government. In other words, 
it is about the relationship and cooperation of state and non-state actors in solving societal problems. 
The past decades have witnessed an increase in the governance of common goods involving public 
and private – or state and non-state – actors. This phenomenon has been analysed by many different 
terms including private governance, civil regulation, voluntary governance, co-governance, 
transnational or global governance, or corporate social responsibility.10 Governance as a concept is 
also used in anthropology, communication science, economics, sociology, and psychology. In 
anthropology, the role of cultural values for the working of governance is addressed. In 
communication science, the role of political and social communication lies at the heart of governance-
related research.  Transaction costs, as well as how governance can help to reduce them, has been 
examined by economists. Studies in sociology are interested in the complexity of how governance is 
achieved, and how social environment and institutional rules affects governance systems. Since 
governance is about behavioural steering, it is closely interconnected with psychological concepts 
such as nudging.87 
  
 
Proposals for mobilizing individuals and society 
The Climate CoLab project is a crowdsourcing platform where people discuss proposals for what to do 
about climate change. Under the heading ‘How can we mobilize individuals and society to shift 
behaviours in order to address climate change?’ numerous innovative proposals were presented. All 
proposals aim to connect global climate change individual and community values to promote the 
adoptions of climate-friendly behaviour. One of them is about sending messages to friends and family 
about climate change. Other suggestions target the community level and, for example, concern 
devising ‘community-specific behaviour change communication and cascade messages through 
different organizations at that level’. One proposal calls for involving selected journalists in 
communicating the findings of climate science for increasing the public’ attention to them. Another 
proposal is to create a global lottery to raise the funds necessary for mitigating climate change. A 
second network worth mentioning is Climate Outreach, which pursues the goal of extending the 
audience of knowledge about climate change through interactions and conversation that resonate 
with people’s values. Climate Outreach targets new audiences, including the Centre-Right, faith 
groups, young people, and people who have been displaced as a result of climate change.  
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